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Introduction: Whose Civility?1  
Sharika Thiranagama, Tobias Kelly and Carlos Forment 
 
Key words: Civility, dignity, respect, protest, inequality, violence 
 
What price civility? The populist successes of the early twenty-first century – from 
Trump in America to Brexit in Britain, from Duarte in the Philippines, to Orban in 
Hungary – have also often been marked by angry disrespect and insult. Women, 
immigrants, Muslims, and the disabled, (as well as bankers and the ‘global elite’) have all 
be the target of deliberate disdain, discourtesy, mockery and invective. As we reassess 
what these populist movements and any response to them might mean for our lives, there 
are widespread calls for increased decorum and respect in public life - for us to put our 
difference to one side and to all try and get along. Commentators on the right and the left 
have been calling for greater civility.2 
Yet, civility has an uneasy history. There is a long tradition of using civility to 
silence dissent, excluding people and issues from public discussions. Promoting civility 
can close down debates, often recasting disagreement in terms of etiquette and manners, 
silencing heterodox views and draining disputes of passion and agonism (Connelly 1999). 
And civility can also promote particular white, male, middle class ways of being in the 
world.  Civility from this perspective is a conservative favouring of the status quo, 
standing opposed to all forms of dissent, rebellion and revolution and in doing so 
forecloses radical change.  
But civility is not always restraining and conservative. In the mid-1960s, the 
American civil rights movement promoted civility as a direct challenge to racism. In 
Selma, Alabama, Martin Luther King and other members of the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference used “civil disobedience” in order to expose and undermine the 
racial supremacism embedded in daily life and supported by the policies of the US state. 
By engaging in self-limiting forms of civil protest, one of the key aims of the Selma 
march was to demonstrate the African-American community’s distinctive and specific 
capacity for civility - rooted in Christianity rather than the dominant liberal notions of 
individual rights and the rule of law (Garrow 1986). African-American forms of civility 
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deployed across the south was a form of political protest that sought to call the US state 
back to its own claims of civilization and to hold white citizens accountable. This type of 
nonviolent civility tried to use the moral power of restraint and respect in order to bring 
about radical change across political and civil society.  
Crucially, civility has also been the basis of political claims amongst marginalized 
groups outside Europe and North America. In India, for example, Dalit political activists 
use idioms of civility to challenge caste-based hierarchies and introduce new grammars 
of democratic politics (Waghmore 2013). Surykant Waghmore describes how Dalit 
struggles focus on challenging Dalit exclusions from public spaces and public life as well 
as generating places within which Dalit lives will be accorded dignity and respect, that 
continue to be violated in other terrains of public life. On Waghmore’s account, these 
“heterotopic” places represent a profound challenge to the self-image that Indian civil and 
political society has used to construe itself as a modern democracy. If the radicalism of 
the civil rights movement sought to hold the state to its own self-image, Dalit civility 
seeks to fundamentally transform the way Indian state and society understands itself. 
Perhaps most importantly, it is not only that the marginalised have tried to use 
civility as a form of protest. Incivility also matters, particularly to the stigmatized. 
Everyday life for racial and other minorities group across North America and Europe as 
well as the Global South, often includes countless overt and covert acts of incivility. 
Indeed, one of the reasons why the election of Trump and its aftermath was felt to be so 
problematic was because of the ways in which it has directly and indirectly promoted a 
particular form of incivility towards people of colour, women, Muslims, Mexicans, 
disabled people and many others. Sue, Capodilupo et al., have used the phrase, “racial 
micro-aggressions,” to describe the everyday forms of racism: “brief, everyday 
exchanges that send denigrating messages to people of colour because they belong to a 
racial minority group… (that) are unconsciously delivered in the form of subtle snubs or 
dismissive looks, gestures, and tones” (2007). As Sue, Capodilupo et al explain, most 
white Americans view themselves as good decent people and find it difficult to 
understand that they, too, engage in unstated practices of ‘incivility’, which are central to 
buttressing racialist regimes in the US and elsewhere. As one of the authors of this 
introduction has experienced, whenever friends from minority communities come 
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together (in the absence of white Americans and Europeans), they will often share and 
discuss experiences of micro-aggressions. Experiences of disrespect and humiliation in 
public life disproportionately fall upon minority and marginalized groups, which is why a 
concern with civility is not only restricted to dominant groups but can also be part of the 
bitter, sometimes humorous, angry, resigned and everyday commentary by marginalized 
communities on their everyday experiences. 
 
What might anthropologists have to say about civility? The dominant (liberal) theoretical 
approaches to civility have widely associated it with respect and restraint in the face of 
difference, rooted in the emergence and development of bourgeoisie urban cultures of 
post-Enlightenment Europe (Sennett 1975; Shils 1992). The history of civility is therefore 
intimately tied up with class and race privilege. In this context, anthropologists have 
often been highly suspicious of claims of civility - pointing to their role in the production 
of inequality and the legitimization of violence, amongst other things. For example, 
James Holston argues that civility is not “inherently incompatible” with “coercion, 
violence, or religious intolerance” (2011, 55). For Holston, the distribution of citizenship 
rights through standards of civility disguises profound socio-economic inequality as 
products of moral worth and aspiration. Holston points thus to the potentially deeply 
conservative, even reactionary aspects of civility. However, Holston’s argument also 
makes it clear how and why anthropologists should continue to pay close theoretical 
attention to civility. He proposes that we understand civility as a series of learned 
dispositions “inscribed in routines of bodily actions and verbal expressions … that permit 
citizens to produce the practices that confirm … the distribution of powers consistent 
with a specific regime of citizenship” (2011. 55). In Holston’s account civility is a series 
of techniques of citizenship generated from the daily practices and experiences of public 
life and manifested through judgments about bodies, language and actions.  Civility, as 
both lived experience and ideology is therefore ripe for anthropological engagement. 
 
In this introduction and special issue, we understand civility as a range of practices and 
norms aimed at promoting restraint and respect in the face of difference. We follow 
Holston’s suggestion in seeing civility as a series of moral injunctions, with multiple 
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histories linked to specific experiences of colonialism and bourgeois life. In its ties to the 
histories of colonial domination and class privilege, civility has multiple faces, invoking 
respect and restraint, but also, often at the same time, implying a stifling conservatism 
that can be used to prevent opposition and exclude the marginal and disenfranchised.  We 
do not begin though by assuming that civility is a good thing or not. We should also not 
assume that all people at all times valorize civility. In some cases, both the powerful and 
the disenfranchised will reject civility (Zerubavel 2002) - think of Trump again. Nor do 
we want to come up with a more refined and precise definition of civility. Instead, we 
seek to use civility as a theoretical provocation that allows us to reexamine the 
implications of attempts to deal with and live amongst difference in all its multiple forms. 
We ask: under what conditions and in what forms does civility become a powerful 
political and moral claim?  What are the histories that mark the ways in which people are 
civil or uncivil to one another? When does civility move from being conformist to 
dissenting, and what are its limits? Or to put these questions another way, is civility a 
fundamentally elite project, that, at its best, papers over and further entrenches coercion, 
inequality and discrimination, and, at its worst, actively creates differentiated forms of 
recognition, selfhood and political subjectivity and humanity (in its extension as 
“civilization”)? 
We propose to understand civility as a “worldly concept”. We mean this in two 
senses. Firstly, as evidenced in our discussion above, it is a concept that has traction in 
the world: a concern with civility and incivility can be found equally in public debate as 
in academic work. In Koselleck’s terms, it is a concept with “semantic carrying capacity” 
that “extend(s) further than the ‘mere’ words employed in the politico-social domain” 
(2004, 76). It is often a word we find utilized as “a weapon” with a “polemical thrust” 
which in its utilization linguistically constitutes a statement about the past, forms of 
change and possible (utopian/dystopian) futurity (2004, 78).  In this process, civility is 
part of a complex of associated terms, such as citizen, civilization, civic, civil society 
which are, even more forcefully, concepts which both describe and order reality around 
them.  
Secondly, civility is “worldly” in a more Arendtian sense. For Hannah Arendt, 
politics is about the space between people. There is no substance in a lone person that is 
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essentially political; it is through people acting together and in reference to one another 
that politics is constituted (1998, 20-78, 2005, 95). Whilst Arendt does not always 
acknowledge the unequal grounds upon which people come together, nonetheless, her 
notion of politics as a space that allows multiple persons to be present together is highly 
useful. Talking about civility, involves talking about how people relate to each other 
where they would appear to have profound differences. Civility therefore allows us to 
emphasize the relationships that are central to virtues, rights and obligations – and pay 
attention not just to questions of how one should live, but how we should live together.  
Within anthropology, using civility as a theoretical provocation can help us to 
rethink the relationship between what others have called the “anthropology of suffering” 
and the “anthropology of the good” (Laidlaw 2016; Ortner 2016; Robbins 2013; 
Vankatesan 2015). The point in focusing on civility is not to side step issues of violence, 
in favor of a focus on more cheerful topics. Rather, it is to move beyond unhelpful 
distinctions between an anthropology focused on violence and suffering, and one focused 
on virtue and well-being. It is to take both violence and its counters seriously, and to see 
how they are caught up, and potentially disentangled from each other. 
 Civility can also help us cut through ongoing debates about the relationship 
between politics and ethics (Keane 2016; Laidlaw 2016). As Michael Lambek has 
argued, ethics is not “reducible either to power or desire” (2000). This may well be true. 
But at the same time, it is also important to recognize that ethical commitments are 
always caught up with politics and economics, amongst other things. In practice the 
distinction between ethics and politics can prove unhelpful, as it limits the types of 
question we ask, and the relationships we seek to draw. A focus on civility, once again, 
allows us to cut through these somewhat forced analytical separations. Claims of civility 
are always deeply ethical, political and economic - in the broad sense that they are 
implicitly or explicitly concerned with the distribution of violence and resources, the 
ways in which and the degree to which the social fabric is hierarchically organized, and 
conflicts over the meanings of virtue, obligation and consequence. Rather than focus on 
more abstract questions about what it means to live a good life, or how power is 
exercised, examining civility as a worldly object shifts attention to concrete problems 
which people grapple with at multiple levels: how do we actually live with others? 
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At a broader level, an anthropological perspective on civility allows us to move 
beyond the theories of civility developed in the context of Euro-American history (Elias 
1994; Sennett 1975; Shils 1992).  One of the major challenges in all the essays in this 
special issue is to understand whether civility has a normative charge more globally, and 
the ways in which civility should be provincialized (Chakrabarty 2000). If, for example, 
the communication of respect is central to civility (Boyd 2006), it is therefore important 
to understand the cultural codes through which civility is signified. What people 
understand to be civil (or uncivil) behavior can never be taken for granted, but is instead 
embedded within particular social and political histories. While liberal theories of civility 
and their critics have linked civility to the rise of bourgeois life in Europe and America, 
such notions of civility are also deeply tied up with histories of colonialism as well. In 
this context, the articles in this collection aim to show the limits of civility through the 
ways in which bodies are marked by pre-existing racial, ethnic and religious histories. we 
Civility is not a ready-made distinction applied to the colonized but is itself formed 
through the colonial encounter. 
 
In the rest of this introduction we set out some of the key theories of civility in order to 
examine the ways anthropology can benefit from these debates, as well as contribute to 
them. Our choice of interlocutors is necessary limited due to space, but we have 
particularly highlighted Edward Shils, Adam Smith, Norbert Elias and Etienne Balibar, as 
they help us to examine the key issue of ethics, violence and difference that are central to 
our discussion. The rest of this introduction is organized as follows: We begin with a 
discussion of the ethical charge and dilemmas associated with claims for civility, 
focusing on Shils and Smith, arguing that the force of civility can be found in the ways in 
which it stands between the instrumental and the principled or virtuous. We then move 
on, through a reading of the work of Norbert Elias, to examine the ways in which the 
state, and its political economies of violence, is central to the ways in which civility is 
made, remade and unmade. The next section then examines how colonialism – largely 
ignored by many liberal theorists of civility – has left civility as racially marked. We then 
turn to the relationship between similarity and difference, arguing that the tensions 
between the potential for a shared sociality and the reproduction of diversity, 
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egalitarianism and hierarchy, run through practices of civility. We end with a discussion 
of the work of Etienne Balibar and his account of the ways in which civility can be more 
than simply a conservative and reactionary concept. 
 
The Value of Civility 
This section examines the ways in which theorists have understood the value of civility- 
as we draw a contrast between Edwards Shils (1997) and others who saw civility as 
“thick” substantive virtue in and of itself; and those who see civility in largely procedural 
terms (Boyd 2006; Calhoun 2000; Sennett 1975). We then turn to Adam Smith as a way 
out of the somewhat artificial distinction between the formal and substantive aspects of 
civility - albeit with limitations in terms of accounting for the political. 
For many advocates of civility, it is a morally thick virtue that gives collective life 
value. Robert Boyd, for example, argues “civility is the disposition that makes political 
life possible because it allows those with different and conflicting views of the good to 
live peacefully side-by-side” (2006, 865). Civility here is more than simply passive 
respect or politeness, but an active and positive form of sociality. For Boyd, civility is 
about the communication of a deep mutual respect (Boyd 2006). Similarly, for David 
Hume, the virtue of civility lies precisely in the “charity” and “generosity” seen through 
“politeness” and “manners’”(1985, 274- 280). Civility in this sense contains a sense of 
the public citizen, willing and able to contribute to the wider good.  
For Edward Shils writing in twentieth century America, the civil public citizen is 
intrinsically connected to the maintenance of order (1997). More specifically, Shils coins 
two different but interdependent kinds of civility, “civility understood as good manners 
or courtesy” and “civility as the virtue of civil society”: civility as good manners involves 
treating others with respect; civility as a virtue involves an attitude that is a concern for 
the common good of society and the willingness to restrain oneself and work against 
antagonisms for the good of minimizing conflict and maintaining order (Shils, 1997, 
339). Shils suggests that civility “restrains the exercise of power by the powerful and 
restrains obstruction and violence by those who do not have power but who wish to have 
it” (1997, 4), it affirms the very possibility of “a common good”. Shils’ approach though 
has its blind spots. As we examine in subsequent sections, the violence involved in 
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civility as the maintenance of social order is largely evacuated from his account. And 
Shils’ analysis fails to capture the ways that civility is often not experienced as a 
straightforward virtue, but one marked by inauthentic deceit and hypocrisy. All too often 
civility can appear as a mask, hiding what we really think and feel. Indeed, the incivility 
of populist politics is often aimed directly at this sense of insincerity.   
In contrast to Shils, who sees a substantive content to processes of civility, 
Cheshire Calhoun argues that civility is a procedural rather than a substantive virtue, 
more like law-abidingness than justice (2000, 252). From this perspective, civility does 
not involve adopting a political and moral critical position - but agreeing on how to deal 
with such issues. Civility is not an end it itself - but a means to other ends. Similarly, 
Richard Sennett celebrates the “mask” of civility, as it allows us to live with others in the 
face of difference (1975). You are not civil for the sake of it, but because it enables us 
live alongside other people without being too much of a burden. As John Cuddihy argues 
in “a regime of civility, everybody doesn’t love everybody. Everybody doesn’t even 
respect everybody. Everybody shows respect for everybody” (1978). You communicate a 
sense of respect for others, irrespective of whether you feel it. It is this instrumental sense 
of civility can lead to it to being associated with deceit. But, at the same time, in treating 
civility as simply about process and instrumental action, there is a danger of ignoring the 
ways in which, for some people, civility can also contain important values of its own – 
such as respect.   
The work of Adam Smith offers one way for us to begin to move beyond the 
division between “thick” and “thin”, virtuous and instrumental, understandings of 
civility. In particular, instead of construing “mutual sympathy” in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759) and “self interest” in the Wealth of Nations (1779) as ethically 
dichotomous and irreconcilable, it is possible to see Smith’s account of sympathy and 
self-interest as mutually reinforcing forms of civility. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
Smith provides a discussion of everyday civility that recognized people can be equally 
predisposed to act selfishly and sympathetically:  
  How selfish soever man may be supposed there are evidently some  
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principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others… 
Nature when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original 
desire to please and an original aversion to offend his brethren…  
In Smith’s account, people are encouraged to express their interests and sympathies 
moderately, and according to the social conventions of the day, making their own 
personal motives and intentions publicly legible. Such forms of civility make everyday 
life and interpersonal relations relatively more predictable and less “nasty, brutish and 
short”.  
For Smith then, focusing specifically on trade, civility takes place on the meeting 
point of self-interest and sympathy for others - combining both thick and thin 
commitments. In this special issue, Marsden also highlights the role that traders have had 
in the development of theories of civility through their ability to make civility both a 
moral virtue and an instrumental good. He draws on the particular example of Afghan 
merchants who move across complex transnational spaces, showing just enough of 
themselves, and holding back at the right moments. Marsden describes how, for this 
diaspora, civility- or more precisely diplomacy – allows them to traverse a variety of 
political and cultural contexts, being both cultural sensitive and commercially astute. The 
traders emphasize savvy, wit and cleverness, as well as cultural sensitivity, but also 
reflect on the implications such skills have on their moral worth. Diplomatic civility 
therefore traces a fine line between honorable conduct on the one hand and flexibility on 
the other. As such, Marsden helps us to move beyond the question of whether civility is a 
form of artifice to examine the role of civility in producing new forms of self-cultivation 
and social connection. 
Adam Smith’s particular take on civility can be seen in the context of a much 
longer conversation about the ways in which instrumental action and principle can be 
merged (Arendt 1998; Agamben 1998; Dewey 1939; Lambek 2010; Venkatesan 2015). 
However, the combination of the means and ends is an accomplishment easier to make it 
theory than practice. Although the instrumental and the principled are always deeply 
entangled, they can still exist in tension, and capturing these tensions is crucial to any 
theoretical account of civility. As Tobias Kelly shows in his contributions to this 
collection, the social energy of civility can come precisely in the spaces where the 
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pragmatic and the virtuous come together and stand apart. Kelly, focusing on British 
pacifists in the Second World War, argues that it is the very tension between means and 
ends that gives claims of civility their potency. He describes how these pacifists tried to 
show that living peacefully in the midst of war, was not simply a statement of principle 
(an end), but could also serve as a practical model for a life without violence (a means). 
Many of these pacifists turned to community farms in particular as an alternative to a 
society mobilized for war. Yet, at the same time, they often lacked the skills necessary for 
agricultural work, and, above all, could behave towards one another in a deeply uncivil 
manner- constantly quarreling and falling out over seemingly trivial issues.  The merger 
of pacifist means and ends was a constant struggle. However, for many British pacifists 
living at peace was important because of, not despite, the space between their aspiration 
for respect and love, and the disappointments of experience. More generally then, we can 
see gaps between practicality and principle that seem to mark claims of civility as a 
challenge rather than a failing. 
 
In the above discussion of the value of civility, politics has largely been left out of the 
picture. There is little sense in Shils’ or Smith’s accounts, for example, of the ways in 
which claims of civility are caught up in a political economy of violence and histories of 
privilege (Keane 2003). In the liberal vision, civility is a space where free individuals 
come together in a space of equality. In this historiography, the civil sphere is a post- 
feudal space, where citizens can interact with each other in equal terms, without the 
marks of status differentiation (Boyd 2006). Yet, civility is never neutral, and is instead 
always rooted in political struggles. Above all, civility has acted, like concepts of “the 
public”, as a restricted, and exclusionary way of differentiating who was a citizen and 
who a subject (to use Mamdani’s (1996) words). Lisa Mitchell’s essay in this special 
issue devotes special attention to redirecting our gaze away from civility as individual 
speech and comportment, and towards the ways in which civility can be understood in 
relation to collective actions in public. Drawing upon collective actions in India, Mitchell 
suggests that we pay attention to the many collective repertoires by which people attempt 
to make themselves listened to, frequently by the state, and the ways in which particular 
actors and communities are rendered noise, as those whose voices cannot be heard. What 
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is significant is not distinct elite and subaltern forms of distinction but how those are 
incorporated into the state’s responsiveness to forms of claim-making. Political 
recognition, Mitchell suggests, is central to civility. Rather than violence being the 
product of the incivility of the “masses”, violence when it emerges in collective 
gatherings, can be the direct result of an unresponsive state, that does not afford 
recognition to some of its citizens and often aggressively silences them.  It is to broader 
questions of violence and exclusion – and their relations with (in)civility that this 
introduction will now turn, first through a close reading of the work of Norbert Elias, and 
then through an examination of the colonial history of civility. 
 
Violence and Civility 
Whilst civility might be about respect and restraint, it is important not to ignore its 
relationship to structures of violence and coercion. Norbert Elias provides perhaps the 
most sustained analysis of the relationship between civility, the state and violence, and 
any attempt to understand these questions must play close attention to his arguments. In 
summarizing Elias’ interpretation, we are not claiming it is persuasive as a socio-
historical account, but rather that it opens up questions about the ways in which the 
monopolization of violence by the state and the growth of particular forms of self-
restraint were mutually reinforcing. Crucially, Elias’s concern with civility was rooted in 
his own experience of the twentieth century. Elias described himself as a member of the 
German-Jewish generation whose scholarly writings were rooted in the collapse of the 
Weimar Republic and spread of anti-Semitism and the triumph of Nazism and the 
systematic extermination of millions of Jews (among them Elias’s mother) and non-Jews 
across Europe. Elias’ two most important books on the subject, The Civilizing Process 
(1994) and The Germans (1997), explores what he sees as the “civilizational” and 
“decivilizational” tendencies that surfaced in France and in the German princely states 
from the sixteenth century onward, respectively.3  
 In The Civilizing Process, Elias traces the decline of violence and the emergence 
of “civility” across France to the “courtization” of medieval life. Sixteenth century 
France, according to Elias, had one of the most developed states in Western Europe; the 
king had his own standing army and was no longer dependent on knights and other 
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warrior groups to defend the kingdom from external and internal enemies. The monarch 
and aristocracy disarmed and pacified these fighters by inviting them to become members 
of court society. As they interacted in court society, these warriors realized that the only 
way of acquiring social prestige, political power and economic wealth was to exchange 
their swords and body armor for modern weaponry: powdered wigs, embroidered tunics, 
sumptuous banquets, court balls and intrigue. French court society provided a place to 
mingle and resolve differences peacefully. These everyday interactions spilled over and 
became embedded across urban and rural life, contributing to the spread of social order 
and political stability throughout the kingdom and to the development of a state that 
monopolized violence. The pacification of daily life encouraged artisans, merchants, 
peasants, churchmen and other groups to interact, and as they did so they became 
increasingly “interdependent”, generating a vast and complex series of networks 
throughout France. Each person in each network became attuned to and was compelled to 
adjust their behavior in relation to those around them, predisposing all of them to exercise 
self-restraint. 
In contrast, for Elias, Prussian court society, like the kingdom itself, remained 
fragmented and exclusionary: local aristocrats forbade commoners from joining it. Unlike 
the members of French court society, Prussia’s nobility and commoners were deeply 
divided, making it impossible for them to mingle and acquire the social and political 
skills to organize, like their French counterparts, a centralized state and curb interpersonal 
violence in daily life. For Elias, there was a direct link between these processes and the 
shape that nazism took. According to Elias, Germans, in contrast to the French, had failed 
to develop a centralized state and to exercise “self-restraint,” leading the Germans to 
forge a  “culture of violence”.  
 It is possible to argue with some of Elias’ historical claims about France and 
Germany. However, the first great theoretical benefit of his account is the way he plays 
close attention to the state and coercion as the grounds upon which civility is made. For 
Elias, civility is reproduced in a context where violence has been radically reorganized, 
monopolized by the state and placed quite literarily out of sight. But at the same time, it 
is important to remember, that the military can be sent back onto the street at any 
moment. Civility does not see the eradication of violence, but its reorganization, with the 
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state playing a crucially important role.  
It is not just that the state sets the conditions of civility, but the absence of the 
state – or at least supporting political structures – can, under some conditions, make 
civility hard to achieve. Paul Anderson argues in this volume, for example, for the middle 
classes of pre-war Syria, for example, the absence of suitable political structures meant 
they were unable to live the civil lives to which they aspired. Civility is not simply an 
issue of face to face encounters, but also of the wider political and economic structures 
that make (in)civility possible. For the Syrians described by Anderson in this collection, 
talking just before the outbreak of the civil war, the ‘disorder’ of the Syrian state 
prevented them from enacting their own sense of dignity. Litter and the constant use of 
car horns, for example, are linked by his informants to a generalized and chronic state of 
political corruption. As Anderson shows therefore, the manners, forms of courtesy and 
etiquette of civility are seen as being closely tied to forms of governance. Civility is not 
just about the mutual recognition of worth, but also the conditions of action. The two 
senses of ‘civil’ (as public participation, and as polite and courteous) are therefore 
brought directly together- but importantly this is felt most keenly in their relative 
absence, rather than their presence. Such an analysis is a useful reminder that for all the 
potential conservatism of civility, it can be sorely missed when it is not there. 
The second important thing to take from Elias’ account is his focus on status 
differentiation. Elias notes a particular tension where forms of “correct social conduct” 
are instituted as universally desirable, and yet dominant groups struggle simultaneously 
to mark them as signs of prestige and distinction that elevate those who practice them 
(1994, 384-386). Elias’ description echoes Bourdieu’s work on “distinction” (1979) in its 
stress on the ways in which class habits and attitudes are lived through largely implicit 
ideas around taste. In this collection, Helene Risor shows how a civil form of victimhood 
has become a quintessential indictor for “proper” citizenship in Chile. In Chile’s long 
democratic transition, notions of friend and enemy are migrating from the political to the 
social, where the urban poor are increasingly criminalized, and their struggle to get by 
makes them unable to adhere to notions of proper conduct. In this context, if civility is a 
matter of communicating respect and consideration (Boyd 2006), such respect and 
consideration is not equally distributed. Risor describes how poor Chileans are 
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stigmatized through class-based notions of decorum, and increasingly seen as potential 
criminals who are unworthy citizens of a new democracy. Livelihood strategies, forms of 
dress, and housing can all place the urban poor outside the boundaries of bourgeois 
civility.   
Crucially, in the making of distinction of status, judgments about bodies are 
central. Elias brilliantly captures the ways in which concerns about defecation, 
procreation and eating have an important role in the ways in which claims of civility have 
played out. But at the same time, Elias’ sensitivity to the bodies of civility, also points to 
a clear blind spot in his work: colonialism.  In the colonial encounter, affective judgments 
about racialised bodies have had a crucial significance in the making of the distinctions of 
civility. Elias’ account is very much rooted in the narrow domestic history of Europe, 
largely ignoring the ways in colonialism has shaped the meanings and implications of 
civility within and beyond this particular space. In Elias’ analysis there is an implicit 
assumption that anyone – so long as they exercise sufficient self-mastery and overcome 
class prejudice can master civility. But in the colonial context bodies can already come 
marked by racialised forms of prejudice, and therefore be a priori excluded, marking the 
hard limits to civility.   
 
Colonial Civility 
Colonialism is central to civility. George Orwell (1937), for example, pointed out that 
European civility was shaped through colonial expansion, as well as the regulation of the 
white working class at home. Indeed, the Indian Empire was extremely attractive for 
relatively less privileged members of the English Middle Classes as, “the people who 
went there as soldiers and officials did not go there to make money; they went there 
because in India, with cheap horses, free shooting, and hordes of black servants, it was so 
easy to play at being a gentleman” (1937,63). Equally importantly, the concepts of 
barbarism and savagery that underlay notions of civilization are deeply entangled with 
colonial imaginaries (Kiernan 1995, 154). Said (1978) and Grosrichard (1998) among 
others, have shown that for many European thinkers visions of ideal political orders were 
informed by a constantly fantasized image of the “Oriental despot”, characterized by the 
lack of control over sensual pleasures of the body and excessive unchecked power. In 
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other words, the antithesis of European civility. Claims of civility were therefore both 
used to justify and were produced through colonialism 
  As such, rather than a category transplanted onto the colonial relations, the actual 
cultivation of European civility was a project that unfolded itself through colonial 
expansion, both in Europe and the colonies simultaneously. European civility always had 
a colonial supplement, as Bhabha argues (1994, 95). Savagery itself was ranked and 
differentiated, for example, India was seen as the place of unending stagnating culture, 
while African slaves and African colonies were seen as the anti-thesis of civilization. As 
Catherine Hall points out “The right to colonial rule was built upon the gap between 
metropole and colony: civilization here, barbarism/savagery there” (2002, 10). European 
forms of civility cannot be understood without what they were being framed against, 
from the eighteenth and nineteenth century onwards through colonial missions – first a 
set of assumptions around “savagery” as forms of different styles of living, which then 
solidified into a nineteenth century biological racism where differences were fixed 
immutably in hierarchically organised bodies (Goldberg 2009, Hall 2002, Hansen 2012).  
In this context, the consistent denial of representative government in the colonies, 
and the violent forms of the colonial state that always undergirded European rule (Hansen 
and Stepputtat 2001) - made practices and understandings of civility explicitly white. The 
classic substance of nineteenth century western civility, an associational life of free men 
allowing dissenting voices to freely debate is, in the colonies, Bhabha argues, 
“confronted with an aporia out of which emerges, in a figure of repetition, the uncanny 
double of democracy itself” (1994, 95). The forms of civility that appeared in the 
colonies were thus clearly marked through the distinction of whiteness, in which 
whiteness had to be made substantive through performative domestic and public spaces 
which differentiated settlers from natives. In the colonial context therefore, but also more 
broadly, particular bodies and people have always already been marked prior to any 
actual public participation as uncivil or incapable of civility.  
 
However, having clearly asserted the relationship between processes of colonial 
subordination and the promulgation of European notions of civility, in this collection we 
also make an argument that there are multiple genealogies of distinction and prestige that 
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underpin regional hierarchical structures, and which often come to mingle with colonial 
projects but are not invented by them. Elias was criticized by Jack Goody, among others, 
for proposing an “entirely Eurocentric” conception of civility, and for never considering 
whether colonial peoples had developed a similar notion and set of practices aimed at 
transforming “passions into interests” (2002). As the multiple contributions to this special 
collection point out, elite and non-elites have generated novel and heterodox forms of 
civility during the colonial and postcolonial era. In this collection essays examine forms 
of civility as a series of practices directed towards the consolidation of the colonial and 
postcolonial state and/or as a series of practices of self-making and community making in 
plural worlds. Essays also stress that there are multiple historical traditions of authority 
and rule that emphasize the capacity to restrain and train one’s body and emotion as a 
political idiom, which actors draw from and struggle with. The attractions of civility for 
many might lie in its promise of mutual recognition. But at the same time, relatively 
egalitarian dimensions of civility can co-exist with more hierarchical traditions. It is to 
the implications of this tension that we shall now turn. 
 
Difference, Mutuality and Emancipation  
At one level, difference is built into civility - we are civil to those who might be different 
from us, or hold different views. But, civility is not exclusively about difference. As 
Adam Smith saw it, for example, a sense of mutuality was at the heart of civility. The 
stranger of civility is not necessarily absolutely strange, radically different. Civil 
disobedience, for one, assumes a certain level of mutual sympathy, or at least the 
possibility of mutual sympathy. The relationship and tensions between the potential for a 
shared sociality and the reproduction of difference are therefore crucial to the practice of 
civility. In this volume, for example, Hansen examines the struggles to create forms of 
civility that cross over the racialized legacy of apartheid South Africa. Hansen argues that 
the governance of apartheid era South Africa fostered forms ethnically and racially 
marked civility, making it hard to develop forms civility that could cross racial 
boundaries. Even the anti-colonial civility of large parts of the anti-apartheid movement 
was based around demonstrating that people of color could master the arts of civic 
conduct within their own communities. In the post-Apartheid period, “the practical 
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meaning of civility… and other associated terms regulating public lives… are now being 
redefined and reinterpreted”, but the “rainbow nationalism of the ANC has so far not 
provided an adequate foundation for a sense of mutuality”. As Hansen has it, “the racial 
history remains too strong”. It is instead the claimed universality of religious community, 
the Pentecostal churches and ideas of Islamic fellowship that provides a space for 
sentiments of fellow feeling across internal and external racial and cultural differences. 
Yet Hansen here also points out, these universalities themselves are not free from the 
long histories of apartheid and the construction of racialized forms of civility. But, 
despite all these difficulties “the promise of a universal ethos of civility that cuts across 
race and class continues to be profoundly attractive to many people.”  
Hromadzic’s essay in this volume stresses similar themes, showing how claims of 
civility in postwar Bosnia can stretch across ethnic and religious boundaries. However, at 
the same time, claims of civility can also reproduce distinctions based on class and the 
urban rural divide. The residents of towns make moral judgments about modes of living 
that can include Bosnian, Croat and Serb, Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox, but at the 
same time seek to exclude rural new comers. Claims of relative civility are a way of 
marking the difference between the rural and backward, and the urban as civilized. There 
are therefore points of solidarity and convergence that can cut through ethnic divisions, 
whilst creating new distinctions.  Importantly, the moral force of these claims comes – 
perhaps counter intuitively- from the sense that it is the “rural” that is politically 
dominant in contemporary Bosnia. In the absence of political power, Hromadzic also 
shows how the material and the aesthetic is crucial to such distinctions. Hierarchies of 
taste are not just about bodies and behavior but also the material token of modernity, such 
as swimming pools and central heating systems. The aspiration to civility therefore 
assumes a form of mutuality, but this a mutuality with limits.  
Along with Hansen and Hromadzic, Thiranagama argues in her contribution that 
civility is lived and experienced in “the tension between hierarchically ordered social and 
political realms, and the promise and movement of new egalitarian logics across those 
social and political realms”.  Both Hromadzic and Thiranagama explore post-war 
situations;  Thiranagama examines the situation in Sri Lanka in which the immense 
destruction and leveling effects of prolonged conflict has both built upon older 
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hierarchical structures of caste and ethnic differentiation as well as challenged them. 
Thiranagama takes civility as centrally concerned with the problem of how multiple 
differentiated but familiar communities live with each other. Thiranagama examines both 
intra-ethnic (internal caste differentiation with Tamils) and inter-ethnic (ethnic Tamils 
and ethnic Muslim) forms of civility produced in post war northern Jaffna. Her essay 
discusses the differentiated civility of manners that maintains dense relations of caste, 
and the civility of distance that newly marks ethnic relations. She argues that hierarchical 
forms of caste and class within Tamil and Muslim society have been challenged by the 
kinds of egalitarian leveling effects of ethnic mobilization and solidarity. Yet, at the same 
time, the promise of egalitarian sociality emerges from within already deeply hierarchical 
worlds. And, as Thiranagama reflects, the promise of ethnic solidarity and civility is also 
based on brutal histories of violence. Her essay therefore focuses on what she calls 
“hierarchically segmented forms of civility”. She suggests that civility should be seen as 
evolving project that appears different when viewed from different social locations, and 
can therefore contain both hierarchical and egalitarian logics at the same time. 
In its links to mutuality, civility is often associated with respect and dignity, and it 
is these aspects that, in particular, can be a major object of struggle for the marginalized. 
In the last two hundred years we have seen movements from the Self-Respect Movement 
in South India (Hodges 2005, Geetha and Rajadurai 1993) - to the Black Lives Matter 
movement in the United States, in which the idea of dignity and equal respect have 
become central to marginalized groups in the face of humiliation and disregard by others. 
This is seen in many of essays in this volume such as Thiranagama, Hromadzic, Mitchell, 
Forment, and Hansen, in which questions of recognition and respect for marginalized and 
subaltern communities are central. 
The egalitarian idea of respect and dignity as something all humans are entitled to 
has become foundational in legal, political, philosophical and social discourse (e.g. Rawls 
1971). Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals placed respect and dignity as a 
central concept within moral theory ([1785] 1996, 52-86). However, at the same time, as 
many theorists have discussed, respect and dignity have historically been shot through 
with hierarchical assumptions. Historically, to offer respect and acknowledge dignity has 
often been to offer deference to a social superior. In contemporary usages though, respect 
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and dignity are also linked to egalitarian logics: it is to accord others as of worth and 
value. This egalitarian usage has not superseded the hierarchical one; we still feel that in 
particular relationships respect has to be hierarchically ordered, students offering respect 
to teachers, children to adults, workers to bosses, and we feel demeaned when we are not 
accorded the respect incumbent upon our positions. While dignity has become less 
ambiguously a property that one can possess without this being necessarily 
acknowledged by others, respect is a quality that fundamentally concerns the relationship 
between people and necessarily articulates a necessary tension around hierarchical 
distinction within egalitarian logics.  
If we return to the South Indian example of the Self-Respect movement, we can 
see this movement between hierarchy and egalitarianism. The caste system has been 
orientated around the constant production of respect and deference from lower to higher. 
In the Tamil language, the word respect mariyathai is understood simultaneously in terms 
of the new egalitarian insistence on dignity, but also in terms of classical word by which 
caste deference was offered. At the same time as elites and upper castes in contemporary 
Tamil Nadu lament that no one shows them respect any longer, Dalits and the so-named 
Other Backward Castes, assert that the showing of respect and dignity towards them is 
the central plank of transforming everyday humiliation. Therefore the tension between 
and the intermingled histories of the egalitarian and the hierarchical is central to notions 
of civility. 
 
However, the struggle for an egalitarian civility is crucial for any attempt to see civility as 
potentially emancipatory. We therefore now turn to the work of Etienne Balibar, who has 
presented probably the most sustained attempt to think through civility as a progressive 
force. Balibar’s notion of civility is idiosyncratic, difficult, but highly illuminating and 
significant. In particular, it enables us to take into account the ways in which civility can 
be exclusionary and inclusive, restraining and violent. For Balibar, civility is less about 
politeness and courtesy, and more about the democratic principle (2002, 30). Balibar sees 
two complementary political projects which civility is attached to and makes possible to 
integrate: projects of emancipation and projects of transformation.  
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Above all, Balibar’s civility is about the recognition of the political status of 
others. The central contradiction, or even aporia, at the heart of the democratic principle 
is the presence, Balibar argues (following Jacque Ranciere), of those uncounted 
marginalized communities, whose possibility of emancipation depends on presenting 
their “own emancipation as the criterion of general emancipation (or as that fraction 
which, in continuing in slavery and alienation, inevitably entails the unfreedom of all)” 
(2002, 6). Projects of emancipation demand that the dignity and recognition of those 
radically excluded are central to any imagining of democracy (2001, 2002). Projects of 
transformation are concerned with (the Marxian project of) transforming the structures of 
the world, of exerting action to fundamentally redistribute, rearrange, and remake the 
world.  Balibar argues that a project of transformation must - as a precondition - place 
emancipation, dignity and recognition at their heart, especially the dignity of those who 
do not fit into majoritarian movements and their projects of emancipation.4 Without 
civility, no transformation can ever become emancipation. 
Balibar sees civility as arising in the context of the massive forms of violence that 
mark contemporary life. The problems of violence are particularly important to those on 
the left, Balibar remarks, who put faith in revolutionary potential, but who have to now 
reckon with the aftereffects of immense violence that revolutionary movements and states 
have inflicted. How do we evolve movements and forms of praxis that are capable of 
reflecting upon and facing up to violence not through a naïve non-violence but through 
forms of anti-violence? Thus civility, in Balibar’s account, is a politics that takes 
democracy - with its antagonisms and struggles very seriously - but seeks to confront 
dominating forms of violence. Balibar’s work (2015) grapples with how to make a 
politics that takes note of the varieties of violence within political life without ceding 
ground to an argument that would allow extreme forms of violence to be politically 
legitimate.  
Laurent Gayer’s contribution to this issue discusses this relationship to violence in 
more concrete form. Gayer’s essay focuses on the practices of minoritized and/or 
marginalized communities in Pakistan and the ethical practices and reflexive self-
understanding of men who live within and engage with these differentiated worlds of 
distinction, but also have to juggle this with practices of violence that protect their 
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communities and also thus satisfy ethical and moral imperatives that emanate from living 
with actually existing plural worlds. An examination of them enables Gayer to rethink 
Balibar’s understanding of the relationship between civility and violence. Instead of 
focusing on institutionalized violence, Gayer studies inter-personal relations between 
Yaqub and his neighbors, some of whom are ethnically, politically and religiously similar 
to him and others not, and how they practice anti-violence in daily life. And, instead of 
focusing on “extreme cruelty” as does Balibar, Gayer studies the way Yaqub and his 
neighbors engage in low-intensity forms of violence. This double shift in perspective 
makes it possible for Gayer to make sense of how the residents of Karachi, a “city at war 
with itself,” curb exclusivist identifications rooted in communalism while at the same 
time maintaining allegiance to their own group.  
Importantly, Balibar coins two forms of civility, top down (by the action and 
authority of a “master”) and bottom up civility (2002, 30). Top down civility is the 
civility of the civilizing mission and conservatism, which either forces people to be civil 
in particular ways, or only authorizes particular people to be recognized as civil. In many 
ways this is the civility that populism responds to with its own incivility. As Balibar 
discusses in multiple writings, the Hegelian understanding of the state is precisely that 
which stands above people and manages conflicts, antagonisms, and forces a primary 
identification that takes precedence over other affiliations. The state however exerts 
enormous amounts of violence in order to manage violence, first its modality of civility is 
normalization and secondly it multiplies violence in an attempt to maintain its legitimate 
monopoly over violence.  
Bottom up civility or emancipatory civility, in contrast, is characterized as the 
force behind a civility aligned around the democratic principle, the means by which 
individuals and collectives, mocked and decried as mobs and multitudes, have mobilized 
themselves as well using the institutions of the state and public life through whatever 
means they can to clear a “shared space” for politics where they have “their place” 
(Balibar 2002, 33). The distinction between top down and bottom up civility has 
resonances with what Forment calls “vertical” and “horizontal” forms of civility. Forment 
describes how Argentinian street scavengers engage and contest with municipal officials, 
politicians, NGOs and waste disposal companies, reconstituting themselves as particular 
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types of citizen. At the same time street scavengers interact with residents, developing 
personal relations of cooperation- and thereby helping to decriminalize and incorporate 
scavengers into public life. For Forment, civility from below contributes to what he calls 
plebeian citizenship- an alternative vision of democratic life and urban governance 
outside marketized and managerialist conceptions- creating the conditions of possibility 
for everyday politics to resurface. Here, bottom up forms of civility transform personal 
uncertainty into collective experience, promoting social equality and direct representation 
that undermined patterns of domination and made government officials accountable. In 
doing so, these novel and heterodox practices pushed back against forms of structural 
violence.  
More broadly, “bottom up” civility can be seen as the space of the civil rights 
movement and civil disobedience more generally. Importantly for our purposes, this is a 
vision of civility that runs counter to one particular vision of civility as “not being a 
burden” (Sennett 1975). In his influential analysis, Richard Sennett describes civility as 
aimed at “shielding of others from being burdened by oneself” through restraint, distance 
and respect (1975, 264). But there are also times when people surely want to be a burden 
on others. Civil disobedience wants to make civility a moral burden on the powerful.  
Balibar’s notion of “bottom up” civility however is not a simplistic valorization of 
populism at all costs. As has been evident in the growing popularity of alt-right 
movements in North America and Europe, the right to incivility against others can be 
celebrated as leveling action against “elite civility” and identity projects. Yet, as Balibar 
forcefully points out, what characterizes the politics of civility is precisely an attempt to 
clear space for the recognition and dignity of others and fundamentally a drawing of 
limits, limits to violence and limits to incivility and humiliation. This runs absolutely 
counter to the celebration of varieties of leveling which have mobilized the idealization 
of hatred against others and the insistence of a singular identity for all, especially in the 
nostalgic celebration of lost whiteness in Europe and North America. 
With this in mind, let us end this introduction by returning to some of the 
questions with which we started: What space can there be for a progressive civility in the 
face of inequality and violence? In a public lecture in 2000 entitled “The Multicultural 
Question”, Stuart Hall asks how we might think about “the unremitting struggle for a 
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more socially equal, racially just society” and how common lives can be built together in 
heterogeneous societies that acknowledge difference (2000, 6). Hall points out that 
traditional liberal answers are unable to understand this demand, erasing as they do the 
demand for particularities, while communitarian responses fix communities as if 
internally homogenous or as if some do not wish to hold onto associational rather than 
ascriptive forms of communities. The question of how we live together in our uneven, 
unequal world with multiple heterogeneous communities has forced us to contemplate a 
“double demand for greater equality and social justice and for the recognition of 
difference and cultural diversity” (2000, 10). Hall suggests a new universalism which 
following Ernesto Laclau he calls an “incomplete horizon” where by new forms of 
universalism can arise, not from transcending all particularities, but from within a 
particular that takes account of others and its own insufficiency in suturing any identity 
finally. Hall suggests that identities “in acknowledging their radical 
insufficiency…[don’t] desert what makes them particular, but …recognize that this 
relativizes the degree to which they can, as it were, affirm difference” without creating 
new exclusions that “undermine demands for equality and justice.” (2000,11). Hall sees 
an ongoing struggle to affirm an open and agonistic democracy that fights against 
racialized and ethnicized exclusion as necessarily the “multicultural” question which 
seeks to reconcile and recognize the claims of both the particular and the universal. 
We would argue that examining civility, in all its ambiguity, allows us to confront 
the key questions of how we can live together.  In our actually existing world, inequality, 
racism, and violence are challenges that concepts of civility have to face. This does not 
mean hanging onto civility in its pure liberal versions, or in its caricatured meaning as 
only a mask for reinforcing inequality, but paying attention to civilities in their multiple 
historical forms  - with all the traces they bear of civilizational exclusivity, hierarchical 
rank, deference and demeanor, but also of egalitarian demands of respect and dignity that 
mobilize new actors and gather new contestations, mobilizations and forms of political 
demand. Civility here too appears as an incomplete horizon in which forms of relating to 
each other in shared publics persist, even as those publics are built on such deeply 
unequal forms. Civility’s freighted history is part of the charge that it brings to social and 
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political life. And it is this complex history that give concepts of civility their irresistible 
energy and force in the lives of so many people.  
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